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OUR COUNTRY'S DANGER, AND ITS WEAKNESS.

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The documents accompanying the message of President Tyler comprise the annual reports of the two chief officers charged with the care of the defences and warlike force of the country, the Secretaries of War and the Navy. We look of course to them to discover the exposed points, the causes of the danger, and the means of defence, with the degree of reliance to be placed in the proposed defences. The Secretary of War is Hon. J. C. Spencer, a gentleman of the first rate talents for the despatch of business of any kind. His report divides our available defences into three classes: naval forces, fortifications, and facilities of interior communication.—In treating of fortifications, and of the general system adopted many years since, on the recommendation of Gen. Bernard, and urging their completion as fast as the resources of the country will allow, he says:

"The works intended for the more remote southern portion of our territory particularly require attention. Indications are already made of designs of the worst character against that region, in the event of hostilities from a certain quarter, to which we cannot be insensible. The estimates submitted, with the means on hand, for the completion of the works at Beaufort and at the mouth of Cape Fear river, in North Carolina, at Charleston, Savannah, and St. Augustine, will furnish adequate defences to those places. To provide for the points still remaining unprotected, in the event of hostilities being threatened before the system of fortifications is complete, a resort to steam vessels of light draught will be necessary; and in reference to some of them, where fortifications would not avail, as already indicated, that species of defence will be indispensable. Five of these in the Gulf of Mexico, and seven on the southern part of the Atlantic coast, are deemed necessary by the Chief Engineer."

The report of the Quarter Master General, Jessup, accompanying that of the Secretary, points to the same thing in the following terms:

"In the event of war with either of the great European powers possessing colonies in the West Indies, there would be danger of the peninsula of Florida being occupied by blacks from the islands. A proper regard to the security of our southern States requires that prompt and efficient measures be adopted to prevent such a state of things. Whether the Florida war be terminated during the next winter or not, I would recommend that measures be immediately taken to erect permanent works at Key Biscayne, Key West, and such other points among the keys or on the peninsula as on examination may be found to possess the greatest military advantages. The timely attention of the government to that important object may save a heavy expense, as well as avert the most disastrous consequences."

Thus it appears that in paying five millions for Florida, to prevent its becoming a refuge for numerous slaves, we have incurred the necessity of defending 1,500 miles of sea coast, to prevent its "being occupied by blacks from the islands." A wise forethought, indeed.

All this allusion of the New York Secretary to designs "from a certain quarter" is, of course, sufficiently intelligible, and is about as direct as could be ventured on by a "Northern Man with Southern Principles," especially when subserviency was of recent adoption. But the Secretary of the Navy, being a slaveholder, a nullifier, one who has seen service in defence of "our peculiar institutions" of republican slavery, can afford to be more explicit.—He says—

"A war between the United States and any considerable maratime Power would not be conducted at this day as it would have been even twenty years ago. It would be a war of incursions, aiming at revolution. The first blow would be struck at us through our own institutions. No nation, it is presumed, would expect to be successful over us for any length of time, in a fair contest of arms upon our soil; and

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no *voise* nation would attempt it. A more promising expedient would be sought, in arraying what are supposed to be the hostile elements of our social system against one another. An enemy so disposed, and free to land upon any part of our soil which might promise success to his enterprise, would be armed with a four-fold power of annoyance. Of the *ultima'e result* of such incursions, we have no reason to be afraid; but, even in the best event, war upon our own soil would be the more expensive, the more embarrassing, and the more horrible in its effects, by compelling us at the same time to oppose an enemy in the field, and to guard against attempts to subvert our social systems.

Heretofore we have found, in the shallowness of many of our waters, security, to a certain extent, against invasion by sea. So long as maratime wars were conducted in vessels of large size and great draught, we had little to apprehend from them except at a few points, and those were susceptible of adequate defence on land. But thiss ecurity can no longer be relied on.—The application of steam power to vessels of war, and the improvements which have recently been made in artillery, are destined to change the whole system of maritime war. Steamboats of light draught, and which may be easily transported across the ocean in vessels of a larger class, may invade us at almost any point of our extended coast, may penetrate the interior through our shallow rivers, and thus expose half our country to hostile attacks.—The celerity with which these movements could be made, the facility with which such vessels could escape, and the promptness with which they could change the point of attack, would enable an enemy, with a comparatively inconsiderable force, to harass our whole seaboard, and to carry all the horrors of war into the securest retreats of our people. The effect of these incursions would be terrible everywhere, but in the southern portion of our country they might, and probably would, be disastrous in the extreme."

Here all is made that can be made of the "shallowness of our waters" and the use of "steamboats of light draught;" but it is plain that the great source of danger and cause of weakness is "the character of our institutions," pointing to an enemy at once "the *promising* expedient"—*so* Mr. Upshur calls it—"of arraying what are supposed *to be* the HOSTILE ELEMENTS of our social system against one another."

What are the "hostile elements of our system?" Are they the temperance men and the rumsellers? Are they the Protestants and Catholics? The Calvinists and Methodists? The whigs and democrats? The farmers and manufacterers? The old States and the new? The east and the west? The Anglo Saxon and the Antanglian? Are any of these to be termed "hostile elements of our system," w'ich a wily and restless foreign foe would think it practicable to array against one another? Certainly not. The only "hostile element" is ONE—that is, SLAVERY. It is this *alone* that offers a "promising expedient" of annoyance to "*any* considerable maratime power" that may come into collision with us, and which, all nations are now informed, will furnish to "an enemy so disposed," "a *fourfold power* of annoyance," to any that he could find, if it were not for the existence of this "element;" and of course our government is subjected to the necessity of a "fourfold" provision of defence to correspond with the special danger thus created. And even with this extra provision, so great is the weakness and debility created in "our social system," by these hostile elements," that the governments of Great Britain, France, Russia, or Constantinople, are here officially told, if they choose to avail themselves of this "promising expedient," "*in the best event*," they can create a war peculiarly "expensive" and embarrassing, and "horrible in its effects" to us, by "compelling us at the same time to oppose an enemy in the field, and to guard against attempts to subvert our social system."

Some of our readers may now recall to mind the famous report by Mr. King, of Georgia, at the extra session, in regard to an increase of our navy, particularly in view of the vast increase of the steam marine of England. In a speech, accompanying that report, we find the following paragraphs:

"The Governments of France and England were adopting an entirely new policy, by employing armed steamers for commercial purposes; thus uniting the sagacity and enterprise of the mercantile community to support the expense of their naval defences—a great and wonderful step in the preparation for maratime warfare. In addition to the lines previously existing, a new one had recently been formed, on a contract with the Brazilian Government, extending from Great Britain to every important port in Brazil. These various lines had been multiplied till they now resemble a perfect web

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across the ocean. Mr. K. had no apprehension that that formidable and sagacious Power had any intention of immediate war with this country: it would not at present suit her policy; but she was gradually and silently yet surely altering her system.—She desired above all things to emancipate herself from the necessity of depending on any of our products for carrying on those manufactures which were the great sources of her wealth. Hence, while she had emancipated her slaves in the West Indies, she still retained millions in slavery in India, and was endeavoring to avail herself of their industry for a supply of raw material now obtained from this country. She looked with eyes of jealous apprehension to the rapid growth and extending commerce of this country, and the moment Great Britain could supply herself elsewhere with the raw material for her manufactures, we might expect war, war to the knife, war with all her thunder.

"Mr. K. here made some remarks on British emancipation, which he considered but as one step in this grand scheme of the national policy. After dilating further on the grand game now playing by that country, Mr. K. asked whether this government would be content to sleep in reckless security under such a state of things, and never take a step to meet and counteract a system of policy which was aimed at our prosperity, and, if possible, at the very existence of our republican institutions? Would we wait till she came upon us like a thief at night? Did gentlemen forget that out of the last fourteen wars in Europe at least ten had been commenced without any formal declaration? No; England would not send us word that she was coming. The thunder of her cannon would be the voice in which she would speak the purpose of her heart to a long hated rival."

N. B. How much was done by Congress to meet this danger?

In reading this portion of Secretary Upshur's report one would think the Virginian had just stumbled on a copy of Samuel Webb's speech at the Albany Convention of 1839, and without fully possessing himself of the important considerations it presents, or magnanimity to acknowledge some of his ideas, had thrown out some of the leading hints in haste, so as to secure himself the honor of their origination. We will copy, in this connection, a paragraph or two of Webb's remarks, only requesting our readers to restrain their expressions of surprise at finding a Quaker so discerning and skilful in regard to the transactions of war, for it is an old saying, that a bystander often sees the points of a game better than the players.

"I need not point to the germs of a foreign war; the day is not distant when the peculiar relation between us and one or two of the most powerful nations of Europe will call for more wisdom than at present governs this nation, to prove that my fears are groundless. Independent of these extraneous causes, there is that in the peculiar relations between the two classes alluded to, which will invite aggression from abroad.

"If one of the European nations, to avenge a supposed injury—to draw off a portion of its belligerent and troublesome, if not *dangerous* subjects—to gain the applause due to those who relieve the oppressed, from cupidity: the desire to monopolize the trade, from ambition, or from any other or worse motive, should send a fleet with eight or ten thousand warriors, each with a promise of promotion, (if not with a commission in his pocket,) to take effect upon their arrival in America, and land this nucleus of an army at or near Charleston, or some other southern port, offering security, "free trade," and *speedy fortunes* to the renegade whites, and liberty and land to the blacks; who can doubt but such an army, composed of the very elite of the military men of modern Europe, now out of employ, and ripe for any warlike adventure, trained under Bonaparte, Wellington, or Blucher, could, by such promises, in a few weeks, seduce to their standard one hundred thousand able-bodied colored men, and with these march from New Orleans, or Augusta, to Philadelphia, or New York, ravaging the intervening country with fire and sword, and laying every city, town or village, along the seaboard, under contribution, and thus make *us* pay the expenses of the war! England was deterred from doing this during the last war, only from a fear of their own islands: that check is now entirely removed.

"Frederick II, King of Prussia, could take a new recruit, who had never bestrode a horse, and in two weeks make him a first rate trooper; in that same time, how much easier would it be to qualify such an individual for a foot soldier? Besides which these soldiers, so trained and inured by the most experienced captains of the day, would all be hardy, able-bodied men—acclimated and inured to hunger and privations beyond the endurance of northern

men. Such is the valor of the freemen of this nation, that in a good cause they could accomplish any thing but impossibilities; but our Florida war has *proved* that it is impossible for them to compete with the hardy slaves, and the restless, ever-watchful Indians, who, accustomed to hunger, to nakedness, and privations from all the comforts, and many of the necessaries of life—practically acquainted with the topography and geography of the country, would be an overmatch for *ten times their number from the North*, unaccustomed to the climate, and, above all, to the deprivations and sufferings that would attend them amid the miasmas of the low lands and swamps, ("the malaria" of America,) particularly when their cause is unjust before God, and cruel in the sight of men.

"In this 'wooden country,' with but few roads, and those narrow and bad—intercepted by forests, streams and morasses, an army much exceeding one hundred thousand men could not operate to advantage. A much larger number would be in each other's way, and would require more to sustain them than they were worth, (in a military point of view,) particularly if the enemy were supported by a maritime nation, with sufficient naval force to insure them a supply of provisions, in case of necessity, and to prevent such a supply to us."

The only material difference between the views of the two statesmen is in regard to the use of "steam vessels of light draft," both for aggression and defence—a difference well accounted for by the advance which has been made in that branch of military science in the last two years and a half. In every other respect their views may be said to be identical, only what one has said with Quaker simplicity and directness, the other clothes in the garb of official circumlocution and Virginia abstraction. They are agreed in regard to the greatness of the danger, and its cause, and the inevitableness of the evils it entails upon the country. The Secretary goes on to say—

"It is obvious that a war thus conducted must be successful to a very great extent, in spite of all the defences on land we could contrive. Nothing less than the conversion of half our country into a military garrison could protect us against it. Such is the exposed condition of our country, such is the character of our institutions, and such the position of our people, that a population of twice our present number, under the best possible military organization, would avail us but little. Whilst the combined Powers of the world could not subdue us, even a secondary naval Power could avoid our land defences, set our armies at defiance, and prosecute against us a war intolerably harrassing and disastrous."

Such is the exposure, nay, the certainty of incalculable disaster, arising out of "the character of our institutions," and "the position of our people," "even a second-rate naval power could avoid our land defences, set our armies at defiance, and prosecute against us a war intolerably harrassing and disastrous." Do not say this is abolition slang: that the South is brave, and sets the world at defiance. This is the official report of the actual condition and liability of the country at this present moment. Well might Senator Pierce declare in his place, that we are in a worse preparation for defence than we were at the commencement of the last war. Considering the changes in our exposures, arising from the state of Europe, the social revolution in the West Indies, and the advance made in the art of war, it is probably not far from the truth.

Now, what does our slaveholding Secretary of the Navy, speaking as the mouth of a slaveholding executive and a pro-slavery cabinet, propose to do about it? What system of measures does he recommend to meet this alarming exigency? Does he tell us that it is the duty of the government only to perform that which is possible, but that it is clearly impossible to defend such a country with such a mighty enemy cherished in its own bosom, and that *unless that great error in our social system* can be remedied, the southern section of the country is indefensible, and must be abandoned at once in case of a foreign war?

The first idea that occurs to a slaveholder when he wants a thing done, is to get somebody to do it for him, and this applies as well to defence as to labor. He therefore proposes that a navy shall be provided, adequate to keep a foreign naval power, Great Britain for instance, from getting access to "the hostile elements of our social system." And as the naval force would be manned exclusively from the north or free States, a double advantage would be gained, as it would not only make northern men do the fighting, but would leave the slaveholders at home to watch their "institutions." We must, then, he says, "meet the enemy upon the

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ocean, with men trained and disciplined for the contest," i. e., northern seamen and not "suffer him to land upon our shores, trusting to a scattered and harassed people, to expel him from their farms and firesides." The history of the two wars already endured, Mr. U. well knows, are not a precedent for future calculations, because the slaves in the British West Indies *are now free*. He says in regard to a navy, that "looking to it as the chief, if not *the only* defence of our country," meaning the slave States, "against those wars of incursions," by which he had before said a "blow would be struck at us through our own institutions," and in which an enemy would find himself "armed with a four-fold power of annoyance," that "might promise success to his enterprise, and at any rate, to the southern portion of our country, would be disastrous in the extreme," in regard to the extent of naval force required, "we *cannot safely* stop short of half the naval force of the strongest maritime power in the world,"—that "with less than this our fleets would only serve to swell the triumphs and feed the cupidity of our enemy," that "it is better to have none at all, than to have less than enough."

This, then, fellow-citizens, is our condition.—The slave States of this union persist in maintaining, nay, in compelling *us* to maintain, to feed with our bread, and to clothe with our cloth, and to enforce with our power, an institution which neither enriches nor enobles the nation, but is at once a source of poverty and reproach, and which, so far from adding anything to the national strength, increases "fourfold" the expenses and difficulties of defence, and the horrors of war.—And now they come and tell us that *on this account alone*, we must have a navy half as large as that of Great Britain, that nothing less will do, and that "it is better to have none at all, than to have less than enough." That it is only on account of slavery, we all know, because we all know how the country has been well defended without any thing like this, in former days, when European nations were so situated in respect to their own colonies, that they could not assail us "through our own institutions."

But how much is it that the slaveholders ask us to do for their protection? That we should provide a navy equal to "half the naval force of the strongest maratime power in the world?" That power, of course, is Great Britain, and there is no other power with which we are in imminent danger of collision. Our present naval force amounts to 52 ships, mounting 2,098 guns, averaging a fraction over 40 guns each, and 14 steamers. The whole number of persons now attached to the naval service is 12,218. The estimated expense of the department for 1843 is $8,213,257. Now the "naval force of the strongest maritime power in the world," Great Britain, is ships, mounting guns, besides steamers, (saying nothing of steamers now in the mail and merchant service, which can be immediately employed in the navy in case of war,) the whole requiring men in service. It was stated by Senator Buchanan, the other day, that our navy cost, for some reason, gun for gun, twice as dear as that of England. If this is correct, then such a navy as is absolutely necessary, so indispensable that it were better to have nothing at all than to have less, would cost in the first instance at least millions of dollars to build it, and then would cost millions a year to keep it up and man it.—To such an expenditure Great Britian drives us by her Emancipation Act. Could she have pushed us as hard by laying out her hundred millions of dollars in ships and fortifications, without emancipation? Certainly not. Well may Mr. Upshur estimate the extra expense and difficulty of defending the country, occasioned by slavery, at "fourfold."

Suppose, then, we decline to build it. What follows is, that we are defenceless and indefensible. But it is a maxim of statesmanship, that a nation which is known to be defenceless and indefensible is at the mercy of other nations. It owes its immunity solely to their forbearance or sense of justice. Are we content to be in this position? Are our relations with Great Britain such that it is compatible with our national independence and our national honor to tell her that we are bound hand and foot by our slaveholders, and utterly incapable of making any defence, in case she chooses to go to war with us; but we hope her magnanimity and sense of justice will forbear to take any advantage of our weakness, either by withholding reparation for the affair of the Caroline, or delaying the settlement of the Boundary Question, or declining to remove her forts from our territory beyond the Rocky Mountains. In short, we trust she will do just as well by us, as if we could defend ourselves. Shade of Bunker Hill! For what did we declare ourselves an independent nation? Was it

to be bound by a handful of slaveholders, and laid at the feet of King George's grand daughter to ask for mercy?

But then, again. how are we to get a navy equal to "half the naval force of the strongest maritime power in the world?" The Secretary of the Treasury tells us that our revenue will fall fourteen millions short of our expenses next year, with very little more than our present navy. He also tells us that he has not been able to borrow money at six per cent., redeemable at the pleasure of the government. He wants to try treasury notes again, but seems to know enough about finance to be aware that it can only be to a very limited extent that these can be put in circulation without depreciating. Our revenue from the sale of lands is about run out. Our state credit is running lower and lower, and dragging down with it that of the nation, and, to a certain extent, that of the whole people individually and collectively. If the states will not bear direct taxes to support their own credit, or to execute their own works, are they likely to bear them any better to build a navy to defend some 250,000 slaveholders, who are the authors of all our calamities? As to any considerable increase of revenue from imposts, it is out of the question, for it is beyond doubt, that we are very near the point where additional duties, by creating at once decrease of consumption and an increase of manufacture at home, would keep the revenue about where it is. To create such a navy, therefore, as will be of any service towards a defence of the South, *is impossible.* And there we are.

It is but justice to the Secretary of the navy, however, to say that he professes himself "aware that this great increase of our navy cannot be effected in any short time;" he therefore proposes it "only as the object at which our policy ought to aim," but he thinks we may, "in a few years, accomplish all that is desirable," by such annual increase as the treasury will allow. But this annual increase is a game that two can play at; and it is possible "the naval force of the strongest maritime power in the world may keep on growing as fast in proportion as our own: so that, even admitting we had the ability to begin and go on according to this plan, we might, after an age of effort, find ourselves still in possession of a navy, fit only "to tempt the cupidity and swell the triumphs of our enemy."

But we cannot do even that. And besides, our wants and dangers are present wants and dangers, not what are to arise "in a few years." The Boundary question, the Caroline case, the Right of Search, the Shipwrecked Slaves, the Creole, are all now pending, and urgent for a settlement, either by negotiation, or by the final resort. They have been delayed too long already for the integrity of our national honor, and delayed, as may be shown, chiefly through the imbecility and the chicanery occasioned by this very 'institution.' Every year's delay is to our injury; the claims must be settled, or abandoned, that is clear. They cannot wait the slow process of creating such a navy as we cannot do without, in case of war—*unless we choose to abandon the slave states to their destiny.* Here we are shut up.

Not only is slavery the cause, *the sole cause*, of our "four-fold" embarrassment and helplessness, and inability to stand up and look a nation in the face as an equal; but it is the cause of our impoverishment and loss of credit and character, that disables us from making any provision for defence. It was well remarked by distinguished Senators, the other day, that a sound fiscality, a good condition of the treasury in regard to resources and credit, is the most indispensable of all the means of public defence—that, without it, navies and fortifications and armies only add to the weight which overwhelms a helpless nation. Now, it is slavery and the slave trade—a system that *always* costs more than it produces, and which, in the last ten years, has swallowed capital by tens of millions—it is this which has absorbed and annihilated the circulating resources of the country, drained the life blood of business, deranged all the courses of trade, destroyed the credit and character of the nation, and presented us in a worse condition, as to fiscal resources and ability, than we have ever been since the Constitution was adopted. And yet our slaveholding administration ask us to build this navy solely because it is needed for the protection of slavery. Let those who uphold it protect it.

But we are not yet at the bottom of the quagmire in which slavery is sinking us.—Suppose we had a navy, and suppose we had the means also of supporting slavery, with all its waste—it avails nothing at all. The whole efficacy and value of this system of defence, which is so ostentatiously brought forward, depends upon its entire and absolute success, keeping an enemy from landing in the slave states. Every

bay, harbor and river must be kept impregnable; every rood of three thousand miles of coast that skirts the slave region must be kept absolutely impervious to the enemy; for, the moment an enemy once succeeds in effecting an inroad upon the soil, the work is done. The magazine needs only one single spark, in one single place, to fire the whole. Now is it, in the nature of things, credible or consistent, that in such a war as is contemplated by the Secretary, *any naval force whatever* can secure to such a country, *with such "institutions,"* absolute immunity from invasion? Do you think all the "wooden walls" of old England would have kept Bonaparte from landing on her shores, could he have been secure of finding "a four-fold power of annoyance" made ready to his hand, and "promising success to his enterprise," in the "institutions" of the country, and by "arraying the hostile elements of the social system against each other?" As to any scheme or hope of defence, then, we cannot do it if we would; we ought not if we could; and it would be of no use if we should. The slaveholders must emancipate their slaves, or we must continue divested of our national independence, or our government must plainly tell the slave states to take care of their own slaves, and defend their own "institutions," in their own way.

How long our statesmen, (by courtesy,) will continue to blink the truth in regard to this matter, depends on the degree of forbearance or of corruption that the British government may think it *policy* to employ —or upon the success of abolitionists, aided by events in Divine Providence in opening the eyes of the people to see how, and by whom, and for whose benefit, this country is governed. My skirts are clear, be the end what it may.

P. S.—There is another difficulty, already well nigh insurmountable, even with our present small navy. The Secretary says:

"Great difficulty is experienced in the enlistment of seamen. To what cause this should be attributed I am unable to say; and, consequently, I am not prepared to suggest any remedy. It is, however, probably true, that the mere seaman is of too little consideration in the general estimate of the service. Laws and regulations securing to him the enjoyment of his just rights, liberal wages punctually paid, and a strict application, if not an extension, of the benevolent policy which provides for him or his family when he is disabled or killed in the service, would probably secure for our ships of war the preference, in most cases, over those of the merchant service."

Here our slaveholding Secretary appears to understand very well how to get men, and make them friends, and secure their services in the defence of the country, in regard to white sailors. Only let the body of slaveholders apply the same principles in the case of black laborers, and the South is at once defended by a wall of adamant against every invader. But the present object requires us to notice the extent of this difficulty, and the admission that to overcome it will require *more money*, when we are already running in debt, and cannot borrow. In this connection it may be reasonable also to consider the following paragraph, from the English Naval and Military Gazette, received by the last steamer:

"We hear on all sides that men are entering fast for the Royal Navy. The ocean at Sheerness is full. *All the ships in commission*, at home and abroad, will be filled up to the war complements, chiefly with landsmen, but who will answer for the purpose very well. We shall then probably make, or be prepared to make, a demonstration to compel the Americans to disarm to the old peace establishment."

This does not look like waiting for our "gradual increase," according to the means of an exhausted treasury.

There is another small item, which shows the effect of the "institutions" upon the defences of the country. Col. Henderson, commander of the marine corps, in his annual report, Nov. 9, 1841, setting forth the demand for an increase of his corps to 3000 men, of which 1500 are needed to guard the navy yards, says:

"The two Southern naval stations, (Norfolk and Pensacola,) more especially require a large force for their security. A large number of arms is kept in each of them, which, by a sudden irruption of the class of people who are not citizens, might be seized and used for most disastrous purposes, unless a force competent for their safe keeping be maintained. The number proposed in this table (300 at each station,) would seem to be hardly sufficient for a service so important."

Thus we have first to deposit large numbers of arms at the Southern stations, of course to be used against the slaves,

and then we have to employ a large military guard to keep them from being seized by the slaves for use against their masters. So helpless and imbecile is the slaveholding country, so dependent upon the protecting power of the free States.

From the Pittsburgh Gazette.

LIGHT IN SOUTH CAROLINA.

The Cincinnati Gazette contains extracts from an address to the Farmers, Mechanics, Laborers, and other industrious citizens of South Carolina," which has just been published in that State. It is written by an "Upbuilder," or inhabitant of the grain growing, as distinguished from the planting, region. It is strongly and well written, avowing sentiments comparatively new at the South, with a boldness and determination which must strike terror into the hearts of the slaveholding oligarchy.

The writer commences by asking his fellow citizens if they are "Freemen," and then declares that the Government of South Carolina is not a *free government*. He declares it to be despotic. "As a Carolinian," he adds, "I am ashamed to say it, but it is true. Call this state a Republic, and ourselves Republicans and Democrats! Alas! we deceive ourselves if we think we are anything more than the *veriest slaves of a lordly oligarchy*."

Next he proceeds to show why this is so, and why, in consequence, South Carolina is so prostrate, losing yearly her population and her power, and destined soon to be shorn both of her wealth and her strength.

So he argues:

"South Carolina contains a white population of	257,681
Of this, nine slave or planting districts, viz: Beaufort, Colleton, Sumter, Edgefield, Georgetown, Abbeville, Fairfield, Orangeburg, Charleston, contain	85,990
The twenty remaining districts, or the grain growing districts, contain	173,691

"Yet these nine districts are represented in the Legislature by 75 Representatives, and 26 Senators, while the twenty remaining districts have only 59 representatives, and 19 Senators. Or in other words, *with less than one-third of the free inhabitants of the State*, they have a majority of 7 in the Senate, and 6 in the House! He presents yet another view, to show his fellow-citizens "how completely they are under the yoke of this slaveholding power." It is this: that fifteen of the grain districts, having a small portion of slaves and 145,075 whites—have only 47 Representatives, and 14 Senators, while the slave districts have majorities of 30 in the House and 17 in the Senate. "Mark," he says, in addition, 'how our seven Congressmen are chosen.' The lowe country, or the slave region, with a population o 115,470 whites, has four, while the upper country with a white population of 142,614 has only three! Hence he concludes that by means o property qualifications the slave interest has usurped the power and offices of the State, and left every other interest to languish and to decay. Hear what he says:

"You put your vote in the ballot box, it is true, but you cannot vote for one of yourselves—you must make your election from among this priviledge class. Of what account, therefore, is your vote? It does not help you one particle, and serves to delude you with the idea that you are freeman that you may raise a clamor about your rights. And who are your masters? A class of aristocratic gentry, who, living upon the labor of slaves for the most part care not a straw what is the condition of the poor, but industrious white men, nor what becomes of him or his family. If they can get some of them for their overseers, they take interest in them according to their skill in managing unruly negroes. And they are glad to make use of all of you on patrol and military duty to prevent a revolt of the wretched beings by whose toil they support their own indolent passions. And how many, let us ask, are these noble gentry, for whose comfort and ease not only their slaves are to toil, but their fellow-citizens must be oppressed by the deprivation of the right of representation? By no computation that can be made, can it be shown that there are more or can be more than 32,703 citizens in the State who have any direct interest in slaves. And this is indeed an exceedingly liberal allowance. Then look at it.

"In a population of nearly six hundred thousand, there are thirty-two thousand seven hundred and three, who not only have the despotic power over their 327,038 slaves, but the entire political power over 225,381 white citizens who cannot by any constitutional means redress themselves when oppressed by legislative authority—who are so completely kept under that they cannot even have the question of their proper rights brought into discussion in the only body that can constitutionally effect a change in the Government. Is there a greater despotism under the canopy of heaven? The state is ruled entirely and completely by about 32,000 aristocrats—men women and children—all told. They make your Legislatures, your Judges, your Magistrates, your Governor. And these your lords and masters, the slaveholding nobility, never do anything for the benefit of the people, anything for the prosperity of the whole State! No; never, never! and yet these are they who prate about democracy and equal rights. What, for instance, have they done for the education of your children? They have provided for theirs. Our taxes have gone to the building of splendid college edifices and the support of learned faculties, that the children of the rich may be liberally educated, whilst the children of the poorer but more industrious citizens have been left to get an education among the pine knots of the sand hills and the forests of the hill country as best they can.

"Fellow-citizens, we must do something to save our beloved State from entire ruin. We must demand our rights with a fixed determination to have them. The Constitution must be amended so that free population, not interested in slaves, may have their rightful representation in the government of the State. This matter of property qualification is Anti-republican and only fraught with disaster to the interest of the great majority of the people. And it will be a burning shame if we allow this small handful of indolent, proud slaveholders to ride over us rough shode, as they have been doing.

FACTS FO[illegible]HE PEOPLE.

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OUR COUNTRY'S D[illegible] AND ITS WEAKNESS.

(Republished from th[illegible]or and Free American.)

The documents accompanying the [illegible] In the event of war with either of the sage of President Tyler comprise th[illegible]t European powers possessing colonies nual reports of the two chief officers [illegible]he West Indies, there would be danger ged with the care of the defences and [illegible]he peninsula of Florida being occupied like force of the country, the Secre[illegible]blacks from the islands. A proper re- of War and the Navy. We look of [illegible]d to the security of our southern States to them to discover the exposed p[illegible]ires that prompt and efficient measures the causes of the danger, and the me[illegible]adopted to prevent such a state of things. defence, with the degree of reliance [illegible]ether the Florida war be terminated placed in the proposed defences. [illegible]ng the next winter or not, I would re- Secretary of War is Hon. J. C. Spe[illegible]mend that measures be immediately ta- a gentleman of the first rate talents f[illegible] to erect permanent works at Key Bis- despatch of business of any kind. [illegible]e, Key West, and such other points report divides our available defence[illegible]ng the keys or on the peninsula as on three classes: naval forces, fortifica[illegible]mination may be found to possess the and facilities of interior communicati[illegible]atest military advantages. The time- In treating of fortifications, and of th[illegible]attention of the government to that eral system adopted many years sinc[illegible]ortant object may save a heavy ex- the recommendation of Gen. Bernard[illegible]se, as well as avert the most disas- urging their completion as fast as t[illegible]s consequences."

sources of the country will allow, he[illegible]Thus it appears that in paying five mil-

"The works intended for the mo[illegible]s for Florida, to prevent its becoming mote southern portion of our territory[illegible]efuge for numerous slaves, we have in- ticularly require attention. Indicatio[illegible]ed the necessity of defending 1,500 already made of designs of the worst[illegible]es of sea coast, to prevent its "being acter against that region in the eve[illegible]upied by blacks from the islands." A hostilities from a certain quarter, to w[illegible]e forethought, indeed.

we cannot be insensible. The esti[illegible]ll this allusion of the New York Sec- submitted, with the means on hand, fo[illegible]ry to designs "from a certain quarter" completion of the works at Beaufort a[illegible]f course, sufficiently intelligible, and the mouth of Cape Fear river, in N[illegible]bout as direct as could be ventured on Carolina, at Charleston, Savannah, an[illegible] "Northern Man with Southern Prin- Augustine, will furnish adequate de[illegible]es," especially when subserviency was to those places. To provide for the p[illegible]ecent adoption. But the Secretary of still remaining unprotected, in the eve[illegible]Navy, being a slaveholder, a nullifier, hostilities being threatened before the [illegible] who has seen service in defence of tem of fortifications is complete, a [illegible] peculiar institutions" of republican to steam vessels of light draught w[illegible]ery, can afford to be more explicit.— necessary; and in reference to som[illegible]says—

them, where fortifications would not [illegible]A war between the United States and as already indicated, that species o[illegible]considerable maratime Power would fence will be indispensable. Five of [illegible]be conducted at this day as it would in the Gulf of Mexico, and seven o[illegible]e been even twenty years ago. It southern part of the Atlantic coast[illegible]d be a war of incursions, aiming at deemed necessary by the Chief Engin[illegible]lution. The first blow would be struck

The report of the Quarter Maste[illegible]s through our own institutions. No eral, Jessup, accompanying that of [illegible]on, it is presumed, would expect to be Secretary, points to the same thing [illegible]essful over us for any length of time, following terms: [illegible] fair contest of arms upon our soil; and